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 Consider the tragic case of four circus clowns whose pie-to-the-face gag effectively 
knocks each one into a cream-pie coma. In each of the four cases, motor capacities (voluntary 
speech, limb movement, etc.) are not available to the patient’s conscious control. Although none 
of our apparently comatose clowns have voluntary motor capacities, each has a unique set of 
internal and external activity going on.  In other words, each of our clowns (Bozo, Chuckles, 
Wiggles, and Krusty, respectively), now sits in a Vegetative State. Now, there’s a problem.  
Sometimes comatose patients are conscious, so there’s a big philosophical and empirical issue 
going on here: how can we tell which patients are conscious and which ones aren’t? Different 
neuroscientists and philosophers use the concept ‘consciousness’ in a variety of ways and have 
proposed different tests based on what they take ‘consciousness’ to stand for.  To solve this 
problem, we’ll need to figure out the best conception of ‘consciousness’ and the test it 
corresponds to. To figure out if there's a way to free conscious patients from their confounding 
bodies, I will: (1) examine four promising proposals in the scientific and philosophical literature 
about the conditions under which patients have vegetative consciousness and how to test for it; 
and (2) consider whether the proposed tests are efficient or accurate measures of detecting the 
kind of consciousness they are trying to test for. Based on how (1) and (2) turn out,  I’m going to 
argue that one of the four theories—the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (or 
IITC)—gives both the best account of consciousness and the most reliable test for it, and 
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CONSCIOUSNESS IN COMATOSE CLOWNS: NO FUNNY BUSINESS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Consider the tragic case of four circus clowns whose pie-to-the-face gag effectively 
knocks each one into a cream-pie coma. In each of the four cases, motor capacities (voluntary 
speech, limb movement, etc.) are no longer available to the patient’s conscious control. In other 
words, each of our clowns (Bozo, Chuckles, Wiggles, and Krusty, respectively), now sits in a 
Vegetative State (VS for short). On the other hand, although none of our apparently comatose 
clowns have voluntary motor capacities, each has a unique set of internal and external activity 
going on.  Now, we have a problem.  Sometimes comatose patients are conscious, so there’s a 
big philosophical and empirical issue that demands attention: how can we tell which patients are 
conscious and which ones aren’t? Different neuroscientists and philosophers use the concept 
‘consciousness’ in a variety of ways and have proposed different tests based on what they take 
‘consciousness’ to stand for.  To solve this problem, we’ll need to figure out the best conception 
of ‘consciousness’ and the test it corresponds to.  So, why exactly should we care about all this 
consciousness stuff?  For a few reasons: First, we don’t want to give false hope (to loved ones 
and researchers alike). Second, we don’t want to waste limited resources (money, hospital space, 
staff time, etc.). Third, while we do want to avoid the first issue, we don’t want to do it by 
unplugging the conscious patients—we want to un-trap them. To figure out if there's a way to 
free conscious patients from their confounding bodies, I will: 
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(1) examine four promising proposals in the scientific and philosophical literature about the 
conditions under which patients have vegetative consciousness ; (2) consider how to test for 
consciousness as described in each case; and (3) consider whether the proposed tests are proper 
or accurate measures for detecting each type of consciousness. 
Based on how (1)-(3) turn out,  I will argue that one of the four theories—the Integrated 
Information Theory of Consciousness (or IITC)—gives both the best account of consciousness 
and the most reliable test for it, and therefore offers the most promise for detecting 



















2. SEND IN THE CLOWNS 
Back at the hospital, the primary care physician Dr. John Dolittle has tried out some tests on our 
clowns in an attempt to figure out which ones are conscious. In spite of Dolittle’s best efforts, the 
test results look both peculiar and inconclusive. Puzzled, he shares his report with the head of the 
coma ward, Dr. Abby Normal, in the hopes of getting a second opinion on the matter. Here’s 
what Dolittle reports to Dr. Normal: 
2.1 The Reports 
Name: Clown, Bozo T. 
Symptoms: fMRI scan showed activity in the spatial and motor cortexes of Bozo’s brain which 
fired after a verbal statement was uttered. 
Test and Results: Patient was asked to imagine standing still in a tennis court and swinging his 
arm to hit the ball. This command was followed by activity in the brain regions involved in 
motor imagery (in the pre-frontal cortex). Patient was next told to imagine walking from room to 
room in his home and visualizing what he would see there. Immediately afterward, the 
parahippocampal gyrus (associated with navigation and spatial imagery) was activated.   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Name: Clown, Chuckles T. 
Symptoms: The fMRI scan showed activity in Chuckles’ parietal lobe. The parietal lobe is 
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related to temperature-tactile stimuli, activated when a patient ‘feels’ cold, hot, etc.. The parietal 
lobe is activated after the glass cube in the patient’s hand when you tell Chuckles that the 
(lukewarm) glass cube in his hand is an ice cube.  
Test and Results: A glass cube and verbal stimulus (‘the instructor will put an ice-cube in your 
hand’) was administered to him. Parietal lobe of Chuckles the clown is triggered after both the 
glass cube and verbal stimulus (‘the instructor will put an ice-cube in your hand’) are 
administered to him. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Name: Clown, Wiggles T. 
Symptoms:  Wiggles did not show activation in the spatial or motor cortices even after testing. 
Instead, Wiggles possessed motion-processing and color-processing capacities which activated at 
different times in different sensory-specific cortices. 
Test and Results: A red patch was held in front of Wiggles’ eyes. At this time, regions V4 and 
V4a of the brain (affiliated with color processing) were activated. Next, a red ball was moved 
back and forth in front of the patient’s eyes. Immediately afterwards, the V5 region of the brain 
(involved in motion processing) was activated roughly 100ms before V4-V4a (color processing).  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Name: Clown, Krusty T. 
Symptoms:  Krusty’s neural systems display high levels of activity and interaction between 
highly-specialized regions of the thalamocortical system. The thalamocortical system has a 
couple things going on. First, it has highly-specialized structures built up to fulfill very particular 
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kinds of functions. Second, it has ways of connecting (or integrating) all these highly-specialized 
systems. So, we have both highly-specialized (custom-made) functional systems and high levels 
of connection between these specialized systems going on (Tononi 293-294). 
Test: A plastic-encased electromagnetic wire coil was released onto Krusty's scalp, generating 
an electric current in the patient's gray matter right under the skull. The current then activated 
brain cells, fiber passageways, and synaptically-linked neurons. The EEG and MRI scans 
displayed lots of activity in Krusty's thalamocortical system—many regions lit up on the MRI, 
including sites with task-specific regions (color and motion detection, etc.) and others affiliated 
with a whole slew of other tasks and capacities of various kinds. The EEG scan (a measuring 
stick for the amplitude of the electrical activity in the brain) showed high amplitudes of electrical 
activity (ringing at roughly 30 to 35 times a second).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
After looking over the patient charts, Dr. Normal doesn't know what to conclude. So, she decides 
to take a look at some of the basic literature in consciousness studies. What she discovers is that 
people are defining consciousness in all sorts of ways. The following are the definitions Dr. 
Normal came across:  
2.2 Concepts of Consciousness 
Object-consciousness versus fact-consciousness 
The doctor finds that some philosophers (like Fred Dretske) draw a distinction between object 
consciousness and fact-consciousness. In object-consciousness (or knowledge of things), the 
perceiver is just aware of the object of experience. (In certain cases,  this object can be the 
experience itself.) In other words, the perceiver does not take the object of experience to be some 
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way or to have some set of attributes—the stimuli is ‘felt’ but no perspective is taken. On the 
other hand, fact-consciousness, (or knowledge of truths) is being aware that something is the 
case—in other words, the perceiver perceives the object as being some way.1 The object is had 
from a certain perspective—the perceiver’s take is a part of the experience (Dretske 263-4).  
Brute-consciousness versus reflective-consciousness:  
As Dr. Normal read on, she finds that some philosophers make distinctions between kinds of 
reflective and fact-consciousness: brute-consciousness and reflective-consciousness (Gallagher 
and Zahavi 119-21). In brute-consciousness, the perceiver is aware of the experience but forms 
no concepts about the experience. Think of the earthworm’s pain when it’s lopped in half by the 
fiendish fisherman—even though the earthworm may not be capable of forming concepts about 
the pain, it is certainly pained by the decapitation—it can feel the pain even if it can’t say 
anything about the pain it’s undergoing. Unlike the earthworm’s pain, reflective-consciousness 
pain demands that the experiencer have some first-person, reflective concept in mind while they 
undergo the experience—so, if the fiendish fisherman gets whacked in the face by the angered 
earthworm, the fisherman will both have an awareness of the slimy slap and be aware that he’s 
aware of the counterattack. Some philosophers think you can make judgments without reflective 
consciousness. By this assumption, reflective-consciousness is a kind of fact-consciousness and 
object consciousness is something a brute thing like the earthworm could have. It follows that 
fact-consciousness requires some kind of judgment, maybe even reflective-awareness.  
Self-awareness versus first-person awareness 
                                                           
1This point about consciousness as consciousness of can be traced back to Brentano’s descriptive psychology project 
in the early 19th century. 
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Our doctor gets to self-awareness and first-person awareness. According to her reading of 
Chalmers, something can be self-aware so long as it’s something like a system capable of 
scanning itself for viruses (Chalmers 221-4). On the other hand, first-person awareness is an 
awareness of who one is and where one is. In other words, the subject self attributes the 
experience, which requires internal introspection. 
In an attempt to see where and how these two concepts connect and where they come apart, 
the doctor thinks up another example. Think of alien limb syndrome. The patient, first-personally 
aware of the limb’s movements, experiences the limb and its actions but does not associate those 
actions/consider those to belong to him/her—there’s no self-awareness—they’re just along for 
the ride. This, to our doctor, suggests that first-person experience does not guarantee self-
awareness. Particularly in VS cases, thinks Dr. Normal, this problem will become even trickier to 
resolve. 
Access-consciousness versus phenomenal-consciousness 
Having found no clear answer, our doctor continues to sift until she comes across an article by 
Ned Block. She takes Block to say that access-consciousness occurs when information is made 
available to the executive control (or ‘scanning’) centers of a system (Block 272-3). Essentially, 
something is access-conscious if there’s the right kind of broadcasting between frontal areas of 
the brain and other, task-specific regions (Crick and Koch 570). When phenomenal-
consciousness is present, the patient can sometimes just have a ‘felt’ dimension to his states—no 
complex thoughts are even present, in some cases.  
When phenomenal-consciousness is present, the patient can sometimes just have a ‘felt’ 
dimension to his states—no complex thoughts are even present, in some cases. Dr. Normal 
 8 
discovers that the relationship between access-consciousness and phenomenal-consciousness is 
controversial. For some, phenomenal-consciousness can be identified with brain structure and 
function. For others, phenomenal-consciousness is something that goes on in addition to (but 
systematically correlated with) structure and function. These issues are pretty confusing to Dr. 
Normal, so she sets this pair aside. After all, she is dealing with human patients in the actual 
world.  
************* 
Now Dr. Normal is even more confused than she was before consulting the literature. She 
accosts her reading materials: 
“Alright, you’ve got some nifty-sounding ideas, but how do we know that any of these concepts 













3. THEORIST THROWDOWN 
Having heard Dr. Normal’s screams of frustration from down the hall, consciousness experts Dr. 
Adrian Owen, Semir Zeki, Giulio Tononi, and Christof Koch cram into Dr. Normal’s doorway, 
each theorist yelling over the others in an effort to get his own idea heard. As the jabbering 
reaches a dull roar, Dr. Normal replies. 
“Quiet, all of you!” Booms Dr. Normal. “Now, I’d be happy to hear all of your suggestions one 
at a time. You there—Dr. Owen—start us off.” 
3. 1. Owen 
3.1.1 What consciousness is 
Dr. Owen explains that he (now) thinks of consciousness as a sort of brute object-awareness plus 
self-awareness and reflective first-person awareness of who and where you are (Martin, 
Vanhaudenhuyse, Coleman, Boly, Pickard, Tshibanda, Owen, and Laurys 1936-8). So, 
consciousness, according to Owen, entails a complex kind of awareness where the patient 
possesses both object-consciousness (knowledge by direct acquaintance that something is going 
on) and fact-consciousness (knowledge about the experience). Put another way, consciousness, 
by Owen’s definition, is knowing who you are, where you are, and what is going on around you. 
He doesn’t really address what his take on phenomenal and access-consciousness is.2  
                                                           
2 Although Owen doesn’t mention it, it’s clear that some form of  access-consciousness is going on here. 
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3.1.2 How to find it 
How do you catch the conscious person? According to Dr. Owen, you need to find out if the 
patient’s spatial and motor cortices can be activated. If so, try to use those areas to get the patient 
to communicate. If this awareness response is present, reproduce this response in a way that will 
allow the patient to communicate yes/no answers by letting them manipulate their own brain 
activity in the spatial and motor cortexes, a method that would not require the use of motor-
response training. This method is called the volitional test. We already have a couple clowns 
who have this kind of activity going on in their brain regions (Bozo and Krusty)—all we have to 
do now is train the patients to use these areas to talk to us. Here are the specifics of Owen’s 
volitional test:  
In order to get a yes/no response pattern,  brain areas involved in motor and spatial 
awareness must be activated according to the yes/no answer each area’s activation indicates as a 
form of command following. The activation of areas involved in motor imagery was used to 
indicate ‘yes’ answers. In order for the patient to answer ‘yes’, he/she must be told to imagine 
standing still in a tennis court and swinging his/her arm to hit the ball. In order to activate the 
areas in charge of spatial imagery to indicate a ‘no’ answer, the patient must be told to imagine 
walking down a familiar street or walking from room to room in his/her home and visualizing 
what he/she would ‘see’ (1930-3).3 
3.1.3 What this means and why it works 
If the VS patient does use this yes/no system, then we know they’re capable of willfully 
                                                           
3 This test is something like the Turing test (Turing 433-60), with the exception of the qualities behind the output. 
While Turing suggested that we get mechanistic imitation of conscious activity from the machines, Owen’ Turing-
like test assumes the binary ‘yes’/’no’ answer indicates not just behavioral imitation but conscious communication. 
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controlling their own brain activity, suggesting that VS patient is conscious (and capable of 
conscious communication) even in the absence of other motor functions. Based on what regions 
of the brain we’d need to activate, it’s obvious, concludes Owen, that three of our four clowns —
Bozo, Chuckles, and Krusty-- are likely conscious, but to know for certain, we’d have to make 
sure that this activity could be repeated on command. Sadly, Wiggles’ conscious state is 
indeterminate at best.  
 Owen goes on to explain the test’s assets in greater detail. Based on this test, not only do 
the VS patients have the capacity to think a given thought (tennis or home)—they can use this 
thought to say something else over and above the raw experience to say something about that 
experience (Owen 132-4). So, the VS patient is not just capable of having certain thoughts, but 
inducing and deploying them intentionally in order to communicate. Even when behavioral tests 
of awareness fail, we can test for internal awareness by allowing the patient to use their 
spatial/motor imagery capacities to communicate. 
“That’s all well and good, but you’ve missed the most important part,” Dr Noh chimes in. 
3.1.4 Some methodological setbacks 
According to Dr. Noh’s criticism, areas of the brain associated with awareness can be activated 
right after verbal commands were presented to the patient. However, these areas can also be 
triggered in the absence of a command as a result of apparently involuntary reflex. By focusing 
on the brain chunk being activated instead of what is activating that brain chunk, it’s unclear 
whether the activated brain area is the result of the intentional action of the patient’s conscious 
effort or just the product of an automatic, bodily reflex. (Even Owen admits that there are still 
errors in taking certain kinds of firing as intentional awareness when it could be just sporadic, 
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reflexive firing (Owen, 2006).)  
Noh is willing to grant that the causal relation in Owen’s volitional test is necessary, but 
he doesn’t think it’s a sufficient determinant of conscious experience. If power of 
misrepresentation is present, the patient’s thoughts will have aboutness, so the thoughts will be 
directed at the object of the patient’s experience. Owen’s test is aimed at testing for intentionality 
(since he’s trying to test for the patient’s ability to mentally represent the object of his experience 
as being some way), but his test fails to meet the criteria you’d need to prove that this kind of 
intentional awareness is present. So, while strongly suggestive of intentional production of motor 
or spatial imagery, we need a better way to substantiate Owen’s test. 
“Oh yeah?” Owen sputters, “Let’s see you come up with a better solution!” 
“Hold your horses, we’ll get there!” Exclaims Noh.  “First, let me just explain what kind of 
consciousness I’m looking for—you know, the right kind of consciousness.” 
3.2 Noh 
3.2.1 What consciousness is 
Essentially, the patient’s consciousness is made up of 1) the awareness of the stimuli; and 2) the 
attribution of traits to this object of awareness (Noh 4-8). Noh believes that the patient's’ ability 
to mentally represent stimuli as having certain properties reveals the intensionality below the 
intentionality of the representation. Intensionality captures the way that a representation 
designates its objects. Different representations can label the same object in different ways. So, 
one representation can’t always be substituted for the other in all circumstances (in thought or 
talk). Noh then makes an example of Chuckles.  According to Noh, Chuckles not only 
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experiences the ice cube, but has certain particular kinds of (intensional) feelings (that the ice-
cube is cold) which belong to the (intentional) beliefs about this experience (where the patient 
believes the ice-cube is in his own hand).  If the patient’s experience possesses these two 
attributes, then the patient is able to get into his multi-faceted mental representation (8-9). 
3.2.2 How to find it 
Noh explains that to overcome the issues which the volitional test encounters, he’s concocted the 
misrepresentation test, which focuses on an area whose reflexive triggers cannot (as the motor 
cortex’s activations is)  be mistaken for state-conscious representational states: the parietal lobe. 
Here’s what you’ll need to do: 
To test for this misrepresentation we can use fMRI or EEG to detect temperature-tactile 
activation by detecting activity in the parietal lobe. Put a lukewarm glass cube in our clown 
patient’s hand. Then, tell the patient that the cube in his hand is an ice-cube. If the fMRI scan 
shows that the parietal lobe is activating, we know that the patient ‘feels’ cold (even though the 
cube in his hand is actually lukewarm). If the patient’s parietal lobe activated after the cube and 
verbal message were given, then the patient is not giving an automatic bodily response (since the 
automatic bodily response should reflect a reaction to the lukewarm cube), where no activation 
of the parietal lobe would occur. Instead, if the parietal lobe is activated, then the patient is 
listening to the verbal message and telling its body to respond accordingly (as if the cube were a 
cold ice-cube).  
That’s all for the methods part, but, according to Noh, it’s got big implications. 
3.2.3 What this means and how it works 
If the clown’s parietal lobe is stimulated, this tells us that he is misrepresenting the physical 
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input-stimulus (by representing the warmer glass cube as being a cold ice-cube), then we know 
that the patient understood the verbal instruction.4 Since the verbal instruction differs from the 
physical stimulus and the body responds according to the verbal instruction rather than the 
physical stimulus, we can infer that the patient misrepresents the stimulus because they 
understand the verbal command and cause the body to follow suit, indicating consciousness. 
“Fine, but why is this any better than my volitional test?” Owen implores. 
Noh responds with an exploration of the broader implications of the misrepresentation 
test. By testing for misrepresentation, we’ve detected what John Searle calls an aspectual shape5 
(or how something is experienced) occurring in the patient. When the patient misrepresents, he 
has some belief about the stimulus he is aware of and that belief contains a certain set of traits, 
both of which allow our patient to construct some aspectual shape, intentionally-directed at the 
stimulus. Based on this criteria, Noh says Chuckles and (maybe) Krusty are conscious. So long 
as our clowns have the right kind of representation, they’re conscious. According to Noh, the 
misrepresentation test gets around the issues of misattributing consciousness to unconscious, 
reflexive states. When the patient misrepresents, he has some belief about the stimulus he’s 
aware of, and that belief contains a certain set of traits, both of which allow our patient to 
construct some aspectual shape intentionally-directed at the stimulus. Because no motor-sensory 
areas are involved in the misrepresentation test, testing for activity in the parietal lobe prevents 
                                                           
4
 Noh, Hyungrae. "Ascribing Consciousness to Vegetative State Patients: A New Methodology."  
(n.d.): 1-14. Print. 
 
5
 Close to Gottlob Frege’s mode of presentation concept, where the nature of the reference itself does not change but 
the way we take it to be does change. For example, a musical note can have different labels (or ‘senses’)--A flat and 
G sharp. Here, we perceive one note in two different ways, but the note (or ‘reference’) itself doesn’t change. 
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us from getting an automated-semantic response (Noh 11).  
Owen is flabbergasted, “Zeki, Noh is crazy, right? Help me out here, pal.” 
Zeki pipes in. “ Sorry, Owen, I’m siding with Dr. Noh on this one—you’re asking way too much 
of our poor patients!  Let’s lay off the requirements a little” 
“See?!” smirks Dr. Noh, “Dr. Zeki is exactly right, which means my theory works better than 
yours.” 
Dr. Zeki throws Noh a puzzled look: “You’re half right, Dr. Noh, but your theory isn’t out of the 
woods just yet either.” 
Dr. Normal nods furiously. “Agreed, Zeki! But before you start your spiel, let me just get my 
worry in edgewise, here.” 
3.2.4.2 Some methodological setbacks 
Dr. Normal explains that, even if typical cases of VS patients manage to misrepresent, there are 
cases of hallucination blindsight cases where this same kind of misrepresentation occurs 
unconsciously. In Paul Azzopardi and Howard Hock’s study, visual hallucination in blindsight 
cases were explored to see whether these illusions could be processed without the conscious 
participation of the patient. According to the results, the patient reports that they aren’t aware of 
the visual stimulus going on in their impaired lobe. The problem is, in spite of this, the motion’s 
direction was processed ‘correctly’ in the visual field, so the ‘motion’ within the illusion was 
detected by the impaired lobe, in spite of the patient’s lack of awareness (Azzopardi and Hock 
877-8). Discrimination (through a kind of mis-representation) occurs, but without the input of the 
patient’s conscious awareness (878). Here, the ‘right’ answer is given, but not as the result of 
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something brought to the attention of the patient’s conscious awareness. So, just because the 
cases of misrepresentation happen to be conscious doesn’t mean that it’s the mis-representation 
that makes them conscious, since this activity can be performed even in the absence of 
consciousness.  
“Your turn. Zeki.” 
The big worry Zeki has with the theories of both Noh and Owen has to do with sticking 
the ‘consciousness’ label on post-conscious activity. Zeki points out that sensory-specific 
detection processes (like color and motion) happen at different times. He argues that there is 
evidence that consciousness can happen even at the level of space-and-time-separated color and 
motion processing and that the unity of experiences is a post-conscious phenomenon.  In cases 
where patients are presented with motion and color stimuli, motion is processed before color by 
roughly 100ms although the patient mistakenly assumes that the two (motion detection and color 
detection) occur in the same instance (Moutoussis and Zeki 1409-11). In fact, he argues, there is 
evidence of mis-binding.  
According to the Moutoussis-Zeki study, patients mis-bind motion detection to color-
detection. Here, the patient scoots the motion-processing later so that it and the color-process 
allegedly occur simultaneously (even though motion processing occurs approximately 100ms 
before color-processing) (1409-10). In a series of trials, patients were presented with a series of 
images (of changing color and direction) and were told to determine which change happened first 
and whether the change was simultaneous. The patients claimed that the motion and color 
changes happened simultaneously. However, the test results show that the patient’s brain regions 
responsible for motion activated before the region responsible for color detection. Since the brain 
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only binds these experiences once each site has processed its respective data and brought the data 
to a perceptual level, it seems that this unification (of visual and motion processing) occurs only 
after the perceptual experience has occurred in the respective sites. So, unified experiences are 
really just post-conscious phenomena (Zeki 584-5). 
Both Owen and Noh toss Zeki a skeptical glare. “And just what would you propose we do 
instead, Dr. Zeki?” the theorists demand. 
“First, you both need to adjust your take on consciousness,” Zeki replies. “I’ll describe my 
version of consciousness then get into the plan of action we ought to take—to save all the 
conscious clowns you guys keep trying to kill off!” 
3.3 Zeki 
3.3.1 What consciousness is 
Zeki asserts that we need to draw a distinction between micro-consciousness and macro-
consciousness. According to Zeki, micro-consciousness is 1) distributed across space in sensory-
specific regions, and 2) distributed across time based on when these regions are activated. For 
instance, since color processing occurs in region V4 and motion processing occurs in the 
geographically-distinct V5 region and each process is its own micro-consciousness, micro-
consciousnesses are distributed across space. Since motion processing (in V5) occurs roughly 
100ms prior to color processing (in V4), micro-consciousnesses are distributed across time. If a 
system has mechanisms which manage to detect things like motion, color, and shape, we have 
conscious experience. Put another way, consciousness just is the right kind of (here visual) 
detection. So, if the visual detection sites in the brain are firing, then we have micro-
consciousness (and if multiple sites are firing at once, we have multiple micro-consciousnesses 
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occurring all at once). More broadly, if the brain has any functioning perceptual detection 
capacities, we have a kind of micro-consciousness going on--visual or other (Zeki 582-4).  
 Zeki thinks of macro-consciousness as a post-conscious binding of various micr-
consciousnesses (583). In other words, macro-consciousness occurs when the brain takes 
processed information from two or more sensory-specific areas and represents them as co-
occurring at the same time. It’s post-conscious because by the time the brain gets to the 
information, it’s already been processed by the sensory-specific sites. Here, the brain links up the 
pre-processed (and therefore perceived) information from each site. Sometimes it does so 
correctly (through binding) and at other times falsely (through mis-binding) where perceptions 
which occur at different times are taken to happen all at once, so that the unified phenomena (of 
color and motion, for example) seems to occur together (582-4). 
While not all VS patients have the ability to visually detect objects, many do seem to 
have functioning sensory-detection mechanisms.  For Zeki, micro-consciousness is always a 
form of brute object-consciousness. In contrast, macro-consciousness is a form of fact-
consciousness, though it doesn’t need to be accurate or reflective. Because this binding appears 
to occur after the experience itself, it seems that we do not possess one unified, conscious 
experience, but multiple consciousnesses which are judged to be unified only after the conscious 
experience has been undergone. This unification only occurs after the conscious detection sites 
have processed their information.  
3.3.2 How to find it 
Present imagery of a moving red ball to the patient’s eyes. If the relevant regions in the patient’s 
sensory-cortices are activated, the patient has micro-consciousness. If the regions associated with 
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post-conscious binding are activated, then the patient also has macro-consciousness. 
3.3.3 What this means and how it works 
A patient who passes this test only needs to have motion-processing and color-processing 
capacities activating at different times in different sensory-specific cortices. So long as our 
clowns possess some kind of perceptual-detection capacities, we’ve got conscious clowns. So 
long as our clowns possess some kind of perceptual-detection capacities, we have conscious 
clowns. For Zeki then, all of our clowns are likely conscious. While all of our clowns most likely 
have micro-consciousness, there might be some that have macro-consciousness as well.  
We may even be able to make a plausible guess that Bozo and Chuckles possess a kind of 
macro-consciousness in addition to their micro-consciousnesses. Because both the motor and 
spatial regions are activated, the brain may be binding these processes together to create a unified 
experience. Although Krusty does show interconnected activity in the thalamocortical system, 
this activity and its location tells us little about the state of our patient’s consciousness. The 
interconnectedness is irrelevant to Zeki’s conception of consciousness and the higher-order 
thalamocortical system is not itself a region responsible for sense-detection. So, while we might 
be capable of inferring that these unconscious connections resulted from a previously-conscious 
perceptual state, the connections themselves tell us nothing about what triggered this or what is 
being unified.  
“Just hold on a minute,” Dr. Normal protests. “Consciousness must be more than detection!” 
3.3.4 Some methodological setbacks 
Dr. Normal expresses her confusion, explaining why it’s not clear that the disparate components 
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of visual processing are themselves different loci of conscious perception. Likewise, the idea that 
macro-consciousnesses’ unification of these space-and-time-separated sensory processes occurs 
after the phenomenal experience is questionable. Although detection happens in each separable 
visual process, this detection can occur even when the subject isn’t consciously aware of the 
detection, suggesting that detection is not equivalent to perceptual experience. If these distinct 
visual processes can occur and function without the input of the subject’s awareness, it seems 
implausible that these disconnected, functioning processes are, on their own, kinds of perceptual 
experience. 
It seems then that macro-conscious connection is the place where conscious awareness 
begins, since this is where active integration appears to occur.  Many systems (like the brain) 
have  a multitude of processing mechanisms which function on their own as independent 
processing sites, but few have the ability to unite the data from each of these processing sites into 
one, integrated, phenomenal experience.  While there is a time difference between the 
occurrences of each visual process, there is not a time difference between conscious perceptual 
experience—it is in this unity that consciousness is formed. It could be that one perceptual 
mechanism is activated before the other, but the perception itself plausibly is able to unify the 
two processes into one experience. Much like H20, where the compound cannot exist without the 
necessary relation of each disparate part to the other, the occurrence of conscious perception 
seems to rely not on the disparate functions of each individual process, but on the connections 
forged between each of these visual processes. 
Zeki wonders aloud. “Alright, what the heck do you suggest we do instead, Dr. Normal?!” 





4.1 What Consciousness Is 
Tononi and Koch present IITC, which maintains that any non-zero amount of information 
implies consciousness. According to IITC, there will be phenomenal-consciousness when there’s 
a non-zero amount of integrated information. Since the information is being integrated, there will 
also be some degree of access-consciousness—if the information is being integrated together 
with their system’s executive centers, then it will also have access-consciousness. While Koch 
and Tononi don’t address the other forms of consciousness, it’s reasonable to suppose that some 
patterns of activation in the system will result in brute object awareness while other patterns of 
activation will result in fact or reflective consciousness. According to Giulio Tononi and Cristof 
Koch, consciousness is characterized by three qualities: it’s unified, it’s informative, and it’s 
integrated (Tononi 287-9). 
1) It’s unified: You cannot divide your conscious experience into parts while in the experience. 
You may divide the experience through analysis after the fact, but this does not mean that the 
experience while being experienced was divided. Similar situations can be found elsewhere. A 
living organism functions as one, unified animal. This is not to say that after the fact it cannot be 
dissected into its separate functional parts, but only that, while living, it is necessarily unified and 
ceases to exist as a living thing once it has been carved and diced in one manner or another. 
2) It’s informative: the conscious experience you have at a given moment of time (t) rules out 
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countless other possible experiences you could be having in that exact moment. The experience 
is specific to this (here and now) particular kind of experience.This system only exists in this 
particular order in this particular moment for this particular kind of conscious perception and 
which disappears once that forged and highly-specialized connection goes away again. This 
shows us that it’s not just detection but a kind of highly complex, integrated system. 
3) It’s integrated: the bigger the amount of integrated information, the more conscious a system 
is. Integrated information is the stuff you get only when the (here neural) mechanisms within a 
system share information with one another and the amount of information obtained from this 
relation is greater than the amount of information which each individual component 
(neuron/neural system) possesses on its own (Koch and Tononi 46). 
On Tononi and Koch’s account, consciousness occurs not in the disparate activation of 
dis-unified neurons and neural systems but in the particular kind of sharing of information 
between these neural mechanisms and systems. The contents of this experience may vary in 
complexity and volume, but at the very least, the contents, whatever they may be, will be unified, 
integrated, and informative (46-7). If the system functions as one, unified system of indivisible 
experience composed of integrated information, the entity is conscious. In other words, the more 
the mechanisms within a system create information which exceeds the amount of information 
each individual mechanism possesses on its own, the greater the degree of consciousness the 
system possesses. Additionally, object-consciousness or fact-consciousness can be present in the 
system—whether it has one or the other will depend on the complexity and specialization of the 
system. The more complex the connections, the greater the amount of shared information, so the 
more likely you have conscious experience. But, a system still has simpler object-consciousness 
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so long as it has some kind of specialized, integrated connection within a system.  
For IITC, then, even at the minimal stages of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness 
can occur. When it comes to access-consciousness, it’s a little trickier. If we divide up access-
consciousness into 2 kinds--(1) detection, and (2) taking what’s been detected and broadcasting it 
to the executive control center of the system (Block 272-4)--then, according to IITC, a system 
that has access-consciousness (2) does have some kind of phenomenal experience. In other 
words, if something is access-conscious (1), it’s not really conscious by IITC standards, since it’s 
missing the crucial component of highly-specialized interconnectedness resulting in a kind of 
informative perception rather than detection. However,so long as the patient possesses the 
integrated, informative, and therefore unified neural system(s), then it has access-consciousness 
(2)--the patient will have some kind of phenomenal, conscious experience. 
4.2 How to find it 
Stick a plastic-encased electromagnetic wire coil on the patient’s scalp. This will generate an 
electric current under the skull. Use MRI and EEG scans to record the brain activity that follows 
the stimulus. If the fMRI scan shows that the brain cells, fiber passageways, and synaptically-
linked neurons are activated in different sensory and function-specific sites, we have 
interconnected brain activity (Koch 24). If the EEG scan shows a high degree of electrical 
activity (which approximates those of wakeful patients) then we have a high degree of 
interaction (and therefore information sharing) going on between these interconnected sites (25).  
“Fine, but how exactly does this make your theory any better than ours?” Owen and Zeki 
demand. 
“Let me try to translate,” Dr. Normal suggests. 
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4.3 What this means and how it works 
Dr. Normal begins. First, for IITC, lots of different regions must be activated for a system to be 
conscious, so this activity is probably not simply a reflex. The higher the level of activation, the 
less likely this brain activity is a reflexive response in the absence of consciousness. So, it gets 
around the first issue Owen’s theory faces. Second, it avoids Owen’s second weakness because 
you can have sufficient levels of integrated activation to achieve consciousness even if the 
centers responsible for self-recognition and self-locating aren’t activated (or malfunction). Third, 
IITC gets around Noh’s issue, since integrated activation can occur even if the patient doesn’t 
manage to ‘misrepresent’ anything. And, fourth, based on IITC’s response to Zeki, IITC avoids 
the weaknesses with Zeki’s test (by not calling unconscious detection mechanisms conscious). 
Even if IITC isn’t perfect, it can at least do more than the other theories can. 
Dr. Normal goes on. This would mean that for IITC, Krusty is clearly conscious. 
Additionally, Wiggles is clearly unconscious. Bozo is likely conscious because he has to 
integrate a lot of information to pass the Owen test (since he must activate a bunch of things to 
construct the kind of awareness Owen demands). Remember that, for Owen’s test, you need to 
have motor and spatial lobes all working together. There may not be as much integration going 
on, but they’re still conscious (because he has a non-zero amount of integration going on in his 
system. If we perform IITC test on Bozo and find that there’s some kind of observable, synaptic 
connection going on between the function-specific regions (those responsible for spatial, motor, 
and temperature-tactile awareness) and other brain regions interacting in this clown, we probably 
have some degree of consciousness going on. If we discover that these function-specific regions 
are connected to geographically-separated brain regions and have some level of complexity and 
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some active interaction going on within these connected regions, we can infer that the patients 
are at least minimally conscious. Likewise, Chuckles might be conscious, since the patient is 
forced to make similar connections in his mis-representation (where our patient has the 
experience of the lukewarm cube, the verbal cue about the cube, and the interpretation of the 
experience, one which differs from the body’s actual contact with the cube).  
As for Wiggles, Tononi and Koch both take seriously the possibility that small systems 
and subsystems that have a nonzero amount of integrated information might possess their own 
consciousness (like the visual system itself, the individual cells, etc.). So even if Wiggles isn’t 
conscious, Wiggles’ subsystems might be. However, the conscious cells aren’t Abby Normal’s 
patient—Wiggles is—so even if we have a bunch of conscious organisms living within Wiggles, 
they aren’t Wiggles, so Wiggles isn’t conscious. Consequently, IITC suggests pulling the plug on 
Wiggles. 
Tononi and Koch grimly affirm Dr. Normal’s interpretation. “We’re afraid so.” 
“No, you’re not getting away that easy,” mutter the theorists. 
Koch and Tononi cast a look of confusion at the group. “Well, just what have we left out?” 
4.4 Methodological Setbacks 
4.4.1 Zeki’s rebuttal: 
Zeki heads the assault.  “Why assume that connectedness within neural systems is even 
necessary (let alone sufficient) for consciousness? Sure, maybe my test’s criteria are too weak, 
but what makes your test any stronger? Even if we assume that integrated brain activity is some 
kind of active information integration, what about this integration tells us anything about its 
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conscious  state? Why should we think that data-swapping must be a conscious activity in all 
cases of its occurrence? Look, it might be the case that a conscious person happens to have the 
additional quality of integration of information going on, but why make the integration a 
minimal requirement for the presence of conscious experience? I’m not denying that a subject 
with integration going on is conscious, I’m just saying that the integration isn't the factor that 
gives the subject its consciousness. Basically, it sure seems like integrated information is a 
product of consciousness, not itself a conscious activity” (Zeki 584).6 
Zeki goes on to attack Koch’s Neurobiological Framework for Consciousness. The 
Neural Correlates of Consciousness (or NCC) project suggests that certain regions (like V1) are 
ruled out as possible nodes of consciousness (Krich and Koch 569-70)-Zeki thinks this claim 
seems unfounded. According to Zeki, not only is V1 a viable possibility, it is necessary for any 
kind of conscious experience, and therefore cannot be ruled out (Zeki 582). Furthermore, why 
not think that this integration (or “binding”) is itself a post-conscious phenomenon? What feature 
of integration tells us that its conscious rather that post (or even un) conscious? (Zeki 584). 
Here’s the issue: even if we assume that this activity is some kind of active information 
integration, what about this integration tells us anything about its conscious state? Why should 
we think that data-swapping must be a conscious activity in all cases of its occurrence? (re-
iterate binding issue). For the same reasons that Owen and Noh’s tests were rejected, IITC 
should also be rejected.  
                                                           
6 Think back to Tim Bayne’s problem case of disconnected experience in cases of absence seizure with disunited 
experience and behavioral output. Since there are cases where the subject is conscious even in a disunited, 




4.4.1.1 Tononi and Koch respond: 
Before this connectivity occurs we’ve just got detection going on. Even within these connections 
we’ve got a pretty minimal kind of consciousness going on. IITC asserts that once the axioms (or 
essential properties of consciousness) are found, consciousness and the phenomenal experience 
of the patient have been discovered. The process of integration works to connect otherwise 
disparate bits of data by both differentiating the phenomenal experience from all other 
experiences and at the same time unifying and connecting all sensory data together within the 
phenomenal experience. The key to this integration is connectivity between mental elements 
which depend causally on the interaction and unity with other elements within a given mental 
system.  As Tononi states, 
The IITC also addresses, at least in principle, the second problem of consciousness, 
which is not considered in other approaches. The IITC claims that, as the quantity of 
consciousness depends on the amount of information that can be integrated within a 
complex, the quality of consciousness (whether visual, auditory, colored, etc.) depends on 
the informational relationships among its elements (Tononi 2004). More precisely, it is 
specified by the matrix of effective information values among all of its subsets. 
According to the IITC, the ”meaning” of each and every quale, such as “red” is provided 
exclusively by the informational relationships among the elements of the complex 
(Tononi 287-9).  
 
So, the elements which unite to form your experience are indivisible—you cannot lobotomize the 
experience you undergo while you sit within the experience. Without this unity, each disparate 
part would act of its own accord as independent elements with no necessary causal connectivity 
and therefore possess no degree of consciousness. Put simply, every conscious experience you 
undergo is unavoidably unified and indivisible based on the causal dependence of the elements 
whose combination comprises your conscious phenomenal experience (as H2o’s existence 
depends not on disparate elements but on the unifying causal relation between the elements of 
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Hydrogen and Oxygen). 
4.4.2 Owen offers a counter-attack: 
IITC talks about mechanisms and neural systems as being conscious, but this is a large leap to 
make given the shortcomings of the empirical data—it might be more plausible to assert that 
these mechanisms give rise to consciousness without themselves BEING conscious entities 
(since each separate mechanism’s possession of consciousness might do away with the necessity 
of integrated information) 
4.4.2.1 Tononi taps out and Koch tags in: 
Koch reminds Owen that IITC does not claim that the neurons or neural networks are themselves 
conscious but does think that, with sufficient interconnectivity and complexity, the systems can 
produce conscious experience. The IITC is concerned with discovering qualia (elements that 
comprise consciousness) by explaining the contributions of Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
(or NCC) to conscious perception (especially visual)—to discover which NCC’s produce each 
particular aspect of consciousness. Again, we’re looking for the neural correlates of 
consciousness, not conscious neurons. According to Crick and Koch, finding the neural 
correlates means finding the producers of particular aspects of consciousness. The theoretical 
framework of the information integration theory of consciousness (IITC) provides a tentative 
solution to questions about the quality and quantity of consciousness produced by physical 
systems (consciousness is affiliated with the brain’s capacity to integrate information) 
While presence and amount of data and data-detection can be mimicked not just by 
(apparently aware but unconscious) animals but inanimate objects as well (such as high-storage 
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capacity computers), the connections made between these data points, when this connection is 
present, requires more complex mental states. 
4.4.3 Noh throws in his two cents: 
Is causal connectivity synonymous with information integration? These interactions seem to 
interact/are affiliated with one another but are not one and the same process. Correspondence 
between information integration and the experience of consciousness does not appear to 
guarantee that conscious experience just is (or is, even in part) information integration 
4.4.3.1 Koch and Tononi respond: 
Even if the connection itself were found to be caused by something/someone else, the mere 
possession of these connections allows the patient to make free association between each part to 
gain access to the capacities of recognition that separates conscious recognition from mere 
command-based, disconnected detection. (So, we don’t just see that there is a plant in front of a 
computer, we recognize what it means/that it doesn’t belong in relation to what usually sits in 
front of a computer/how we feel/that it is we, the person in possession of this recognition that is 
doing the thinking and feeling.) 
As a puzzle’s completion gives you the finished picture, so a neuron on its own, like one 
individual puzzle piece, does not embody the entire picture within its miniscule shape, but, 
together with the remainder of its neural coalition, comprises (in some circumstances) an NCC). 
In cases where they’re not connected (c/c one kind has been lost), this does not mean that each 
can exist independent of the other, only that whatever was taken away was not essential for 
consciousness (or) Zeki’s definition of consciousness is a bereft conception, one that does not 
account for the complexity of even basic consciousness (detection of motion is not one and the 
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same as recognition of motion/moving objects--one is automatic, unconscious, the other is a 






















After shooing the theorists out of her office, Dr. Normal begins to process the proposals. Owen’s 
test gets it wrong sometimes, so we’d run the risk of lying to family and friends by calling 
automatic, bodily reflex the product of a (now gone) conscious agent. Noh’s theory runs into the 
same issue, just in a different section of the brain. Zeki’s test would certainly save us from 
having to pull the plug on any of our clowns, but it’s not clear that disparate sensory-detection 
sites make for conscious experience. Even though IITC isn’t perfect, it at least seems to 
overcome the limitations of the other theories by identifying not just the activation site, but the 
type, quality, presence, and cause of the trigger and how it relates to other neural systems which 
might serve as motivation for the trigger (where the absence of connections indicates absence of 
thoughtful motivation and action). So, Dr. Normal thinks that IITC does the best justice to the 
unity that consciousness seems to have. She decides to pull the plug on Wiggles. 
Does this mean that we should pull the plug on Wiggles and cases just like him? Should 
we use resources to try to wake indeterminate cases like Bozo up? These are tricky questions 
which I leave the reader to find the answer for themselves. I haven’t given definitive proof for 
why IITC is the best theory out there—I’ve only tried to show that, of the three theories, IITC 
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Theorist Owen Noh Zeki Tononi and Koch
Conscious or Unconscious? conscious likely (un)consciousconscious (likely) conscious
Name
Brain Function
Theorist Owen Noh Zeki Tononi and Koch
Conscious or Unconscious? likely (un)consciousconscious conscious likely conscious
Name
Brain Function motion and color-processing  activated at different times in different sensory-specific cortices
Theorist Owen Noh Zeki Tononi and Koch
Conscious or Unconscious? (likely) conscious unconscious
Name
Brain Function
Theorist Owen Noh Zeki Tononi and Koch
Conscious or Unconscious? conscious unconsciouslikely consciousnscious
Consciousness Chart
Bozo
activity in the spatial and motor cortices occurs after verbal command is uttered
Chuckles
activity in Chuckles’ parietal lobe after verbal cue and physical stimulus
Wiggles
Krusty
high levels of activity/interaction between highly-specialized regions of thalamacortical system.
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